Articles Tagged with Sentencing

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United States v. Mateo-Medina, — F.3d —, 2017 WL 76944, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 342, No. 15-2862 (3d Cir. Jan. 9, 2017) (plain error for district court to rely upon, at sentencing, arrests that did not result in conviction; racial disparities in arrest rates)

Maximo Mateo-Medina appealed his sentence of imprisonment for twelve months and one day for illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) & (b)(1). The Third Circuit held that the district court erred in considering, at sentencing, arrests that had not resulted in convictions. The error was plain under controlling Third Circuit precedent: United States v. Berry, 553 F.3d 273, 281-84 (3d Cir. 2009). Notably, the opinion relies upon implicit racial bias and racial disparities in arrest rates.

Mr. Mateo-Medina pled guilty to the reentry offense. The PSR calculated his criminal history as category II based on a 2000 conviction for driving under the influence and a 2012 conviction for fraudulently applying for a passport. The PSR also listed six other arrests that had not resulted in convictions; the PSR did not describe underlying conduct.

The Guidelines range was 8-14 months’ imprisonment. “At the sentencing hearing, both the prosecutor and the defense argued for a sentence of time served, which would have been the equivalent of roughly six months, or the lower end of the Guidelines range.” The district court disagreed, and imposed a significantly longer sentence. In explaining the sentence, the district court commented on Mr. Mateo-Medina’s arrest record:

I also cannot overlook the defendant’s rather extensive . . . interaction with the criminal justice system. But there were as I counted, I believe seven [sic] arrests, two convictions in three states since 1988. So, the defendant . . . has engaged in conduct which to the Court’s view belied and made ring hollow a little bit his desire to merely come to America to seek a better life.

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Here is a recap of some recent victories from the Sixth Circuit. Good to see vigilant defense counsel using foresight to prevent undue restrictions resulting from sentencing conditions.

United States v. Arnold. Sixth Circuit: A jury convicted Appellant of being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the district court departed upward, at least in part, because of its concern that a longer term of imprisonment was needed to ensure that Appellant received appropriate mental health treatment. Specifically, the district court found that Appellant’s “anger” warranted an upward departure to promote public safety, but also that Appellant so needed a “psychiatric intervention” that the Court felt compelled “to grant the government’s motion to go outside and above the sentencing guidelines” to ensure the Appellant would receive that treatment. The Sixth Circuit found that the district court abused its discretion.

United States v. Kelly. Sixth Circuit: Appellant violated his terms of supervised release by failing to register as a sex offender. As part of its Judgment, the district court imposed that district’s rote conditions of supervised release for sex offenders. But the Appellant’s last sex offense predated the revocation by 26 years. Moreover, the record demonstrated that Appellant had a low likelihood of recidivism (for sex offenses), had no mental disorder, had benefitted from previous therapy, and the age had lessened the risk of re-offending. Under such circumstances, the district court abused its discretion and the sentence was substantively unreasonable. The case further highlights the need for Counsel to be vigilant when Courts seek to impose “standard” conditions of supervised release.

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The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) is one of the harshest federal gun laws. If a defendant has three or more violent felonies or serious drug crimes, the penalty for being a felon-in-possesion of a firearm goes from a maximum of ten years’ incarceration to a mandatory minimum of fifteen years and a maximum of life. Camden Barlow entered a guilty plea to being a felon-in-possesion knowing that the government believed that he was an Armed Career Criminal. After he pled, however, he sought at sentencing to first undo his plea by arguing that none of his prior convictions qualified him as a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He alternatively argued that even if he were a felon-in-possesion, he did not have the requisite three prior convictions for violent felonies required by the ACCA. He lost in the district court on both arguments.

The two issues in the case were: (1) What is a felony? and (2) What is a violent felony?. As with many terms of art in federal sentencing, what seems like an easy question becomes complex when its answer requires delving into state sentencing procedures. For ease of application, federal sentencing law says that any crime, whether a state classifies it as a felony or a misdemeanor, is a federal felony if its maximum penalty is over one year in jail. Seems simple enough, but in practice it isn’t.

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Rodney Vinson allowed police officers to search his house. The officers found a rifle and ammunition. We don’t know why the police were at his home or whether they were looking for guns or something else, but in keeping with a theme from United States v. McLeod, we again are interested in what happened in a state court years before the federal case.

Mr. Vinson had pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor offense in North Carolina that the government contended was a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (MCDV). A conviction for an MCDV bars someone from possessing a firearm, but if the conviction is for a crime that is not an MCDV, as Mr. Vinson argued, he did not violate any federal laws by owning a rifle.

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Gregory McLeod pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Government sought an enhanced penalty under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), arguing that Mr. McLeod had at least three prior violent felony convictions, all of which were South Carolina second-degree burglaries. If the Government was right, and the District Court believed it was, Mr. McLeod faced a prison term of fifteen years to life. If Mr. McLeod was right, he faced no more than ten years in prison. The Fourth Circuit doesn’t tell us more about the facts of his offense because what we really care about is what happened in South Carolina state court in 1998.[1]

Mr. McLeod had a total of five convictions for second degree burglary. The District Court found that all five convictions were violent felonies. The indictments in “those cases charged McLeod with breaking and entering a commercial building with the intent to commit a crime.” Seems simple enough, right? But sometimes a state burglary isn’t a federal burglary.

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In white-collar cases, loss drives the sentencing guidelines. If a person is convicted of a federal fraud charge, probably the single biggest legal issue that will matter to that person’s sentence is what the loss amount is.

By contrast, the biggest thing about the case that will matter is what judge the person draws. It’s better to have a great sentencing judge and a high loss amount than a low loss amount with a judge who sentences more aggressively.

But I digress.

money-choise-concept-1439274-m.jpgThe government’s view of most fraud cases, in my experience, benefits from the clarity of hindsight. After everything has fallen apart, it’s easy to see that, say, a person selling an investment vehicle was using a new investor’s funds to pay someone who is clamoring for his or her money back.

In hindsight, it’s easier to see a Ponzi scheme than it may be in the crush of the moment. Some people plan to run Ponzi schemes, others fall into them through circumstance. Such is the way of the world.

In any event, loss for a Ponzi scheme can be tricky. Generally, the loss amount under the sentencing guidelines is the amount of money that was reasonably foreseeable to be lost by the victims. And it’s what’s reasonably foreseeable for the person committing the crime.

Ok, fair enough. The trouble is with the “credit against loss” rule. The sentencing guidelines explain that when the person being sentenced has paid some money back before the authorities or the victims cottoned onto the scheme, that money should be deducted from the loss amount.

This makes sense. If my son steals $20 from my wallet, but feels bad and puts it back before I notice, he should get some credit for that.

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Remember back with this blog was more than just Short Wins? Remember when there were long and loving descriptions of cases?

I still aspire to get back to that vision for the blog – that was fun. Seriously, look for more long write-ups soon. I’ve been distracted by writing for Above the Law (here is a link to my columns (I particularly like the one about cannibalism)) and my day job as a practicing lawyer.

But, if you’re jonesing for those long write-ups again, thanks to the good people at James Publishing, you can now read them in one handy-dandy book. It has the jazzy title Criminal Defense Victories in the Federal Circuits. Or you could just read the archives.

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It’s a relatively slow week in the federal circuits.

My favorite case of the last week is United States v. Torres Pimental. You’ve got to love a suppression motion being granted off of a government delay in presentment.

To the victories!

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The big news in this edition of Short Wins is United States v. Abair – a simply crazy Seventh Circuit.

I already wrote about it for a general legal audience on Above the Law (Inspector Javert Goes Smurfing in Indiana) – for our purposes, the legal issue is whether she was appropriately crossed on statements in her tax returns or student loan applications.

I had a case years ago where the AUSA and I litigated whether he could use similar statements in cross if my client testified. We lost. Happily, we weren’t able to appeal the decision, but it’s freakin’ insane the way this stuff comes in sometimes. Abair is a nice step in moving the law in the right way.

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It’s a good week for sentencing remands in the federal circuits. To my mind, the most interesting case is United States v. Salgado, where the Eleventh Circuit reversed a district court for considering the person who was being sentenced’s role in the underlying offense that money was laundered in connection with, when the person was sentenced for money laundering. When you’re figuring out the guidelines, the Eleventh Circuit said you can’t do that.

Mr. Salgado was a leader in the drug operation in the case, but he wasn’t a leader in the money laundering. It turns out there’s an application note that says leadership on one offense doesn’t translate into leadership for the other.

To the victories!