Articles Tagged with “False Information”

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This week’s favorite Short Win is United States v. Gray. I say this less because of the legal issue involved – a jury instruction for “malice” – than for how much fun the opinion is to read. Here’s the opening:

Words are slippery things. Take “malice,” its legal definitions alone can encompass: the intent to commit a wrongful act, reckless disregard for the law, ill will, wickedness of heart, and the intent to kill. See Black’s Law Dictionary 968-69 (7th ed. 1999). But can malice’s fifty shades of meaning include “improper motive?” Former flight attendant Nancy Gray, convicted of providing false information regarding a bomb threat on an airplane, seeks to convince us that she was denied a fundamentally fair trial when her jury was instructed that malice meant “evil purpose or improper motive.” Because we find that the district court’s definition just won’t fly, we vacate Gray’s conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

It goes on from there. And, really it’s a sad story about a flight attendant snapping. But it’s good prose.

To the victories!

Thumbnail image for Thumbnail image for you win.jpg1. United States v. Gray, First Circuit: Appellant’s conviction for giving false information regarding a bomb threat on an airplane was vacated and remanded because the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the definition of malice. By instructing he jury that malice could be “an improper purpose,” the trial court reduced the government’s burden of proof.

Defense Attorney: Inga L. Parsons
2. United States v. Medina, First Circuit: After pleading guilty to failure to register as a sex offender, Appellant was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment and 20 years of supervised release. This sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing because the 20-year period of supervised release was based on the erroneous classification of Appeallant’s SORNA violation as a sex offense. In addition, two conditions of supervised release–one restricting Appellant from accessing or possessing a wide range of sexually stimulating material, and the second requiring Appellant to submit to intrusive penile plethysmograph testing–were not justified by the record.

Defense Attorney: Edward J. O’Brien

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