Articles Tagged with “Criminal History”

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United States v. Mateo-Medina, — F.3d —, 2017 WL 76944, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 342, No. 15-2862 (3d Cir. Jan. 9, 2017) (plain error for district court to rely upon, at sentencing, arrests that did not result in conviction; racial disparities in arrest rates)

Maximo Mateo-Medina appealed his sentence of imprisonment for twelve months and one day for illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) & (b)(1). The Third Circuit held that the district court erred in considering, at sentencing, arrests that had not resulted in convictions. The error was plain under controlling Third Circuit precedent: United States v. Berry, 553 F.3d 273, 281-84 (3d Cir. 2009). Notably, the opinion relies upon implicit racial bias and racial disparities in arrest rates.

Mr. Mateo-Medina pled guilty to the reentry offense. The PSR calculated his criminal history as category II based on a 2000 conviction for driving under the influence and a 2012 conviction for fraudulently applying for a passport. The PSR also listed six other arrests that had not resulted in convictions; the PSR did not describe underlying conduct.

The Guidelines range was 8-14 months’ imprisonment. “At the sentencing hearing, both the prosecutor and the defense argued for a sentence of time served, which would have been the equivalent of roughly six months, or the lower end of the Guidelines range.” The district court disagreed, and imposed a significantly longer sentence. In explaining the sentence, the district court commented on Mr. Mateo-Medina’s arrest record:

I also cannot overlook the defendant’s rather extensive . . . interaction with the criminal justice system. But there were as I counted, I believe seven [sic] arrests, two convictions in three states since 1988. So, the defendant . . . has engaged in conduct which to the Court’s view belied and made ring hollow a little bit his desire to merely come to America to seek a better life.

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Rodney Vinson allowed police officers to search his house. The officers found a rifle and ammunition. We don’t know why the police were at his home or whether they were looking for guns or something else, but in keeping with a theme from United States v. McLeod, we again are interested in what happened in a state court years before the federal case.

Mr. Vinson had pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor offense in North Carolina that the government contended was a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (MCDV). A conviction for an MCDV bars someone from possessing a firearm, but if the conviction is for a crime that is not an MCDV, as Mr. Vinson argued, he did not violate any federal laws by owning a rifle.

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Gregory McLeod pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Government sought an enhanced penalty under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), arguing that Mr. McLeod had at least three prior violent felony convictions, all of which were South Carolina second-degree burglaries. If the Government was right, and the District Court believed it was, Mr. McLeod faced a prison term of fifteen years to life. If Mr. McLeod was right, he faced no more than ten years in prison. The Fourth Circuit doesn’t tell us more about the facts of his offense because what we really care about is what happened in South Carolina state court in 1998.[1]

Mr. McLeod had a total of five convictions for second degree burglary. The District Court found that all five convictions were violent felonies. The indictments in “those cases charged McLeod with breaking and entering a commercial building with the intent to commit a crime.” Seems simple enough, right? But sometimes a state burglary isn’t a federal burglary.

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It’s been an interesting few weeks in the circuits (and, apologies for the gap in posting – pesky family vacations).

Probably my favorite is United States v. Mergen, about whether an FBI agent’s statements that what the guy charged with a crime was doing were ok and legal were admissible. I tend to think FBI stings that take advantage of how weak the entrapment defense is are one of the more loathsome things our federal government does – any time you can poke holes in that I think it’s a good thing.

Also of note is United States v. Bagdy – there, a guy who spent an inheritance on stuff that wasn’t restitution, instead of restitution, didn’t violate his supervised release conditions. Supervised release can be insane – especially when restitution is in play. Nice work for the Third Circuit in dialing it back.

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In this edition, I think the most interesting case (of a number of interesting cases) is United States v. Garcia.

There, the government had an agent testify as an expert. The Fourth Circuit reversed, because the agent’s “expert testimony” exceeded the bounds of what counts as expert testimony.

The way agents get qualified as experts is, often, nuts. It’s good to see the Fourth Circuit rolling it back.