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Retroactivity In The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and The Parol Evidence Rule

One of the hardest things about representing a person charged with a crime in federal court is that the law is often changing. A decision that makes sense based on the law at the time, may not make sense later, if the law moves.

Fortunately, sometimes when the law changes, it changes for the better. And, sometimes when the law changes for the better, a person charged with a crime can benefit from it.

The Sixth Circuit provides a nice example of this in United States v. Cornell Smith.

Mr. Smith was charged with distributing more than a kilogram of crack cocaine. His lawyer negotiated a plea agreement for him under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C).

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C)

A plea under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) – commonly referred to as “C” plea by those who practice federal criminal law – binds the court at sentencing. Normally, a United States District Judge has complete discretion to impose a sentence up to the statutory maximum, or down to probation if there is no mandatory minimum.*

Under a C plea though, the parties agree either on a specific range or a specific sentence. The sentencing judge then has a choice – she can accept the agreed sentence or reject the plea entirely and the person can go to trial.

Some district court judges routinely reject C pleas because they feel that they encroach on their power too much. Some prosecutors routinely refuse to enter into them because they fear a reaction from the judge.

Mr. Smith’s C Plea

Mr. Smith’s C plea was to 15 years. Mr. Smith and the prosecutor attached to the plea agreement a sentencing worksheet that said that the guidelines range, as they calculated it, was 168 months to 210 months. Presumably, the guidelines worksheet was there to convince the sentencing court that the C plea should be accepted. In any event, it was a C plea to 15 years.

Trouble Brews

The presentence report, though, found that the guidelines range really should be 210 months to 262 months, because the United States Probation Officer who wrote the presentence report found that a guidelines enhancement applied that the parties thought should not have.**

In response to this calculation, Mr. Smith’s attorney wrote to the Probation Officer that:

The Present Report as authored is a firm commitment to the mandatory guidelines. The guidelines are dead. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 739 2005; United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 2005). [sic] declared the mandatory guidelines unconstitutional. The plea agreement entered into between the United States Attorneys Office [sic] and Defense Counsel was not based on the guidelines and therefore, there is no miscalculation by the attorneys. The plea agreement reached between the attorneys and their clients was based on the fact that a 15 year maximum sentence was sufficient and in the interests of justice. The Presentence Report failed to consider the validity and worthiness of the plea agreement entered into by the parties. The plea agreement was valid and in the interests of justice. Worshiping the dead mandatory guidelines gives honor to the deceased guidelines and gives them more weight and respect than the rulings of the United States Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The mandatory guidelines should be left in their crypt and not brought above ground level. (emphasis added)

It probably felt good to write.

The Court, in any event, accepted the C plea and sentenced Mr. Smith to 15 years in prison.

The Law Changes

After Mr. Smith was sentenced, the United States Sentencing Commission changed the sentencing guidelines for crack cocaine. The Sentencing Commission decided that the change in the crack guidelines is retroactive.

Normally, once someone is sentenced in a federal court, their case is over, and the sentence cannot be changed. There are a few narrow exceptions to this rule though.

One of them is if the guidelines have changed, and the sentencing commission makes the change retroactive. As 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) says, such a resentencing can happen

in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), upon motion of the defendant or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or on its own motion, the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

Though this only happens if the person was originally sentenced based on the sentencing guidelines.

So, for Mr. Smith, the question is whether he was sentenced based on the sentencing range under his C plea.

C pleas And Sentencing Ranges

The Supreme Court very recently held that a C plea does not prevent someone from getting the benefit of a retroactive change in the guidelines under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) if the person’s sentence was based on the guidelines in Freeman v. United States. So Mr. Smith is eligible for a new sentence if his C plea was based on the guidelines.

There is, though, the problem of his lawyer’s statement to the Probation Officer, which expressly said that the sentence was not based on the guidelines, but, rather, on “the interests of justice.”

As this case shows, in federal criminal practice, sometimes it’s better not to talk about the interests of justice.

The Parol Evidence Rule

Happily, the Sixth Circuit held that when determining whether a C plea is based on the sentencing guidelines, you don’t look at parol evidence.

Most criminal defense lawyers choose their practice area so they don’t have to think about the parol evidence rule. They’d rather think about parole evidence (get it?).

The Parol Evidence Rule is the rule that when interpreting a contract, like a plea agreement, you don’t look at evidence outside of what’s in the document.

So, here, the court of appeals looked only at the plea agreement itself, and not at the defense lawyer’s statement, and determined that Mr. Smith’s plea was based on the sentencing guidelines.

As a result, the Sixth Circuit sent Mr. Smith’s case back for resentencing under section 3582.

* This discretion is sometimes overly celebrated among those charged with a crime. Just because a judge can give probation for, say, health care fraud with more than $100 million in losses doesn’t mean that the judge will. It’s a bit like how I could sell you my car for $100. Sure, I’ve got the legal ability to do it, but I’m not going to.

** For those not in the know, before sentencing in every federal criminal case, a presentence report is written by a United States Probation Officer. The report contains a calculation of the now advisory sentencing guidelines, as well as a social history of the person being sentenced. And, yes, this is not what you normally think of Probation Officers doing.

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