John Doe (not his real name – but the guy shouldn’t be singled out any more than he already has been. If you really want to see his name, it’s on the opinion from the Fourth Circuit) wanted to have gay sex with a stranger.
Instead of going online like a normal person, he went to a national park in North Carolina. Mr. Doe was in his sixties – apparently baby boomers don’t use Grindr.
Mr. Doe was not the only person in the park looking for men who were looking to have sex with strangers. In response to a complete absence of real crime anywhere in North Carolina, law enforcement was there too.
The law enforcement officer Joseph Darling was on patrol. Darling saw Mr. Doe on a trail hiking toward him. As they passed each other, Darling said hello. Doe grabbed his groin.
A few minutes later, Darling saw Doe again on an unofficial trial. They talked about the weather for a few minutes. Then Darling told Doe that Asheville – which they were near – was an open community that is accepting of gay folks.
Mr. Doe said that he “wanted to be F’ed.”
Darling indicated that he would be into that. (the record says that Darling said that he replied “okay or yes, or something to that affirmative”)
As Darling described it later, he “gave [Doe] every reason to believe that [Darling] was good to go.”
Mr. Doe then turned around – they were three feet or so away from each other – and backed into Darling.
With his left hand, Darling reached back and “very briefly” touched Darling’s fully-clothed crotch.
Darling responded, “Police officer, you’re under arrest.”
Mr. Doe was charged with disorderly conduct. He was convicted by a magistrate judge and sentenced to 15 days in jail, along with a fine and a bar on going in a national park for two years.
Disorderly conduct for these purposes is defined by 36 C.F.R. § 2.34(a)(2) (some CFR provisions establish federal crimes in national parks – see 16 USC § 3) and has three elements:
(1) using language, an utterance, or a gesture, or engaging in a display or act;
(2) that is obscene, physically threatening or menacing, or done in a manner likely to inflict injury or incite an immediate breach of the peace; and
(3) having the intent to cause or knowingly or recklessly creating a risk of public alarm, nuisance, jeopardy, or violence.
The Fourth Circuit vacated this conviction, holding that there’s no notice to Mr. Doe, or anyone else, that brief clothed touching of someone’s body who says that they want to have sex with you is obscene.
Which is fair enough. The Fourth Circuit made two other great points though.
First, in response to an argument from the government that really this was a prosecution for Mr. Doe wanting to have sex right there on the unofficial trail, the court of appeals noted:
Defendant’s conviction was for disorderly conduct–not disorderly thoughts or desires. And it is undisputed that Defendant’s actual conduct never went further than his backing up to Darling and very briefly grabbing Darling’s clothed crotch. Moreover, even Darling agreed that, “for all [he] knew, [Defendant] could have very well intended for [the intercourse] to happen at [Defendant’s] house.” J.A. 88. And such private sexual conduct would, of course, have been perfectly legal. As the Supreme Court pronounced a decade ago, “[l]iberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct” and “allows homosexual persons the right to” engage in consensual intimate conduct in the privacy of their homes. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
Finally, the Fourth Circuit said the whole point of the notice requirement was so that the government can’t just make up crimes to punish people for. (for an excellent National Law Journal article on this, go here)
Yet this looks like exactly what you’d expect can happen from government enforcement of loosely defined laws – the government uses them to bully unpopular groups.
the facts of this case illustrate the real risk that the provision may be “arbitrar[ily] and discriminator[ily] enforce[d].” Hill, 530 U.S. at 732. The sting operation that resulted in Defendant’s arrest was aimed not generally at sexual activity in the Blue Ridge Parkway; rather, it specifically targeted gay men. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the all-male undercover rangers arrested only men on the basis of disorderly homosexual conduct.
The Fourth Circuit also shot down a government argument that this was motivated not by hatred of gay people, but by citizen complaints:
If the public is . . . not similarly troubled by a woman propositioning her boyfriend for sex and then briefly touching his clothed crotch, there would exist no citizen complaint and no related sting, even for otherwise identical heterosexual conduct. Simply enforcing the disorderly conduct regulation on the basis of citizen complaints therefore presents a real threat of anti-gay discrimination.
Also the Fourth Circuit determined that touching someone who says they want to have sex with you is not physically menacing – the other prong of the disorderly conduct regulation.