United States v. Dahl, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 4394538, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15171 (3d Cir. No. 15-2271, Aug. 18, 2016).
The district court sentenced William Dahl as a career sex offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5, having decided that Dahl’s two prior Delaware convictions for unlawful sexual contact with minors qualified as “sex offense convictions” under 18 U.S.C. § 2426(b)(1)(B)).
Section 4B1.5 applies when a defendant has a prior “sex offense conviction,” which includes “any offense [covered by 18 U.S.C. § 2426(b)(1)] … perpetrated against a minor.” Section 2426(b)(1)(B), in turn, encompasses any “conviction” for a state sex offense “consisting of conduct that would have been an offense” under listed federal statutes.
As in any good defense-oriented discussion of a sex offense involving a minor, your blogger will gloss over the facts. The legal issue was whether the district court should have done the same. Specifically, the issue was whether the “categorical approach” applies in determining whether Dahl’s state convictions qualify as “sex offense[s]” under § 2426(b)(1). The “categorical approach,” as many readers of this blog will know, requires courts to look only to the elements of the predicate offense, rather than to the facts underlying the conviction, to determine whether the offense supports a recidivism enhancement. E.g., Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013). Thus the enhancement does not apply if it is possible to commit the predicate offense with conduct that would not merit the enhancement, even if the defendant’s own conduct would. Continue reading →