There are two interesting opinions I’d like to highlight from this crop.
First, there’s United States v. Prado from the Seventh Circuit. Every now and again, in sentencing, a district court will say it can’t consider something. It seems to me that whatever that something is, these days, a district court can probably consider it. Prado is another example of that proposition.
More sensationally, check out the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Maloney! Laura Duffy, the AUSA for the Southern District of California, watched the en banc argument in this case, decided the government’s position was wrong and asked the Ninth Circuit to vacate the conviction. Nice.
To the victories!
1. United States v. Fish, First Circuit: Appellant was convicted of being in possession of body armor after having been convicted of a crime of violence. The conviction was reversed because none of Appellant’s previous convictions qualifies as a crime of violence.
Defense Attorney: Thomas J. O’Connor, Jr.
2. Kovacs v. United States, Second Circuit.pdf: The Eastern District of New York denied Appellants’ petition for writ of error coram nobis. The Second Circuit reversed and granted the writ after it found that Appellant’s lawyer rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant’s lawyer gave erroneous advice regarding deportation after pleading guilty.
Defense Attorney: Nicholas A. Gravanta, Jr.
3. United States v. Maynard, Second Circuit: Appellants were convicted after a series of bank robberies and ordered to pay restitution. Because the amount of restitution included bank expenses beyond the amount taken, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded for a new determination of restitution.
4. United States v. Salazar, Fifth Circuit: After violating the terms of his supervised release, Appellant was sentenced to prison and an additional period of supervised release, including special conditions. The Fifth Circuit found that the district court abused its discretion by ordering imposing the special condition without demonstrating that the condition was reasonably related to statutory factors.
5. United States v. Urias-Marrufo, Fifth Circuit: The district court denied Appellant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded because the district court did not properly consider the merits of Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
6. United States v. Adams, Seventh Circuit: Two of the appellants received sentencing enhancements for maintaining a “stash house” after being convicted of drug offenses. Because the sentencing guideline provision which allowed that enhancement was not in place at the time of the offense, their sentences were reversed and remanded.
7. United States v. Maloney, Ninth Circuit: The United States Attorney moved to vacate the sentence and remand the case after reviewing a video of the en banc oral argument. The court agreed that the prosecutor had made references during rebuttal that were inappropriate and granted the motion to vacate.
8. United States v. Harrison, Tenth Circuit: After being convicted by a jury for a drug conspiracy charge, Appellant was sentenced to 360 months in prison. The sentence was vacated and remanded because the court improperly adopted the calculation in the presentence report showing that Appellant was responsible for more than 1.5 kilograms of methamphetamine.
Defense Attorneys: O. Dean Sanderford and Raymond P. Moore
9. United States v. Jones, Eleventh Circuit: Appellant was sentenced to 180 months for being a felon in possession of a firearm. After the Supreme Court ruling in Descamps, it is clear that Appellant’s prior convictions cannot serve as an Armed Career Criminal Act predicate offense. Because a sentencing enhancement was incorrectly applied, the sentence is vacated and remanded.
10. United States v. Baldwin, Second Circuit: Appellant was sentenced to 87 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to possession of child pornography, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. During sentencing a two-level enhancement for distribution of child pornography was imposed. The sentence was vacated because there was no finding of knowledge as required to impose that two-level enhancement.
11. United States v. Lagrone, Fifth Circuit: Appellant was charged with two felony theft counts and sentenced to two concurrent terms of 45 months’ imprisonment. Because each of the two theft offenses involved Government property with a value less than $1,000, she could not be convicted of more than a single felony count. The case was therefore vacated and remanded.
12. United States v. Prado, Seventh Circuit: After pleading guilty to one count of extortion, Appellant asked the district court, during sentencing, to consider a similar case and the sentence imposed during that case. The court did not allow that information to be introduced. Appellant’s sentence was reversed and remanded because the court erred in not understanding that it had discretion to hear Appellant’s argument and that error was not harmless.
13. United States v. Shannon, Seventh Circuit: One of Appellant’s special conditions of supervised release was that he could not possess any sexually explicit material. This condition was not discussed by anyone prior to its imposition. Based on that lack of findings or explanation on the lifetime ban, the condition was vacated.
14. United States v. Howard, Eighth Circuit: Appellant’s sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing because one of his prior convictions no longer qualified as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act after the Supreme Court’s decision in Descamps v. United States, ____ U.S. ____, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013).