It's been a big week for resentencings - especially in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.
The DC Circuit came in with an important decision on the BOP's Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. The Ninth Circuit weighed in on supervised release conditions in a sex case.
Though, really, six opinions from our federal circuits last week and all of them involve a resentencing. It's a sad kind of winning.
To the victories?
1. United States v. Godoy, D.C. Circuit: Appellant pled guilty to mail fraud, was sentenced to 60 months in prison, and ordered to enroll in the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. Because he could not be ordered to enroll in the program, his sentence was modified to reflect that enrollment was voluntary.
2. United States v. Preston, Ninth Circuit: Appellant was convicted of abusive sexual contact and sentenced to 50 months in prison and lifetime supervised release, subject to several conditions: (1) participating in plethysmograph testing; (2) prohibiting the possession/viewing of "any other material" of a sexual nature; and (3) prohibiting contact with or being "in the company of" children under 18. The court did not make specific factual findings before ordering the testing in condition (1). On remand, if the court again orders testing, factual findings must be made. Because condition (2)'s reference to "any other material" was too broad, remand for clarification on this point was warranted. Finally, remand on condition (3) was appropriate to add a mens rea requirement and for the court to explain its reasons for imposing the condition, given that it implicates significant liberty interests, or, if it cannot, to narrow the condition appropriately.
3. United States v. Deen, Sixth Circuit: Appellant was convicted of distributing crack and sentenced to 66 months in prison and four years of supervised release. After violating supervised release, he was sentenced to two years in prison to "give the Bureau of Prisons another chance to do some in-depth rehabilitation." Because the Sentencing Reform Act prohibits a court from imposing a sentence to enable a person to complete a treatment program or otherwise promote rehabilitation, the court erred in imposing a sentence based on appellant's rehabilitative needs. His sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.
4. United States v. Love, Seventh Circuit: Appellant was convicted of distributing and conspiring to distribute crack. Because he committed these offenses before the effective date of the Fair Sentencing Act, but was sentenced after, he was entitled to resentencing under the Act's less stringent crack provisions. Resentencing was also proper because the court incorrectly calculated the guidelines sentence. For these reasons, his sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.
5. United States v. Wren, Seventh Circuit: Appellants were convicted of crack offenses. They both had original Guideline ranges above the statutory floor and received sentences below that floor because of the substantial assistance they provided to the prosecutor. After they were sentenced, the Sentencing Commission made changes to the Guideline ranges for crack that would have permitted a reduction in their sentences. Because the court erred in ruling that appellants were prevented from receiving lower sentences under Guideline § 5G1.1, the case was remanded.
6. United States v. Macias-Farias, Sixth Circuit: Appellant was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to 320 months in prison. Because the court failed to make the findings necessary to enhance appellant's sentence for obstruction of justice under Guideline § 3C1.1, remand for resentencing was required.